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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(k) (Supp. 1992), pursuant to an order 
of the Utah Supreme Court dated March 25, 1993 which poured the 
case over to this Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Was the trial ccnil correct in tif nying Plaintiff's 
Motion for Extension of Time to Designate Expert and Motion for a 
Continuance of Trial as not timely or well-taken when the motion 
was filed six weeks after tin* i ill I inn I in plaintiff's 
designation of experts and the Plaintiff had ample time and 
forewarning that she was required to produce expert testimony 
regarding the standard of care--a prima facie element of her case 
in chief? 
2. Was the trial court correct in granting Defendants' 
motion for Summary Judgment when Plaintiff tailed hi piovide 
expert testimony regarding standard of care, thus leaving no 
genuine issue of material fact? 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. The decision of a trial court to deny a continuance 
should not be reversed unless it is shown that there was an abuse 
of discretion, Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1375, 1377 (Utah 
11H8). This Court should affirm unless it is found that the 
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trial court "has abused that discretion by acting unreasonably." 
Hill v. Dickerson. 839 P.2d 309, 311 (Utah App. 1992). 
2. A motion for summary judgment should be granted only if 
the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Hunt 
v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414, 415 (Utah 1990). This Court must examine 
the evidence in a light most favorable to the party opposing the 
motion. Id. 
DISPOSITIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
"Upon motion of a party, the court may in its discretion, and 
upon such terms as may be just, including the payment of costs 
occasioned by such postponement, postpone a trial or proceeding 
upon good cause shown...." Utah R. Civ. P. 40(b) (1993). 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56 controls the granting of a 
motion for summary judgment. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings Below. 
This is a medical malpractice case commenced on June 19, 
1991 by Plaintiff/Appellant L. Diane Turner (Plaintiff). (R. 
2-11.) Thereafter, Defendants/Appellees Craig H. McQueen, M.D. 
and Utah Orthopaedic Associates & Sports Medicine Clinic 
(Defendants), filed an answer and discovery ensued. (R. 12-16) 
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A scheduling conference was held on July 20, 1992, wherein 
the parties agreed to the following dates: (a) Plaintiff's 
witnesses (expert and otherwise) to be designated on July 31, 
1992; (b) Defendants' witnesses (expert and otherwise) to be 
designated on August 10, 1992; (c) Discovery cut-off October 9, 
1992; and (d) four-day jury trial set for November 30, 1992. (R. 
34-35.) 
On July 31, 1992, Plaintiff designated Dr. Robert Home as 
the only medical expert witness prepared to testify on her 
behalf. (R. 38, 157.) On August 7, 1992, defendants designated 
their experts and other medical witnesses. (R. 39-41.) 
On September 11, 1992, Defendants moved for Summary Judgment 
on the grounds Plaintiff failed to produce competent expert 
testimony necessary to prevail on her medical malpractice claim. 
(R. 47-49.) On September 21, 1992, Plaintiff filed a Motion in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and moved 
for an extension of time in which to designate an expert witness. 
(R. 81-102.) Defendants filed a Reply Memorandum in support of 
their Motion for Summary Judgment on September 23, 1992. (R. 
103-111.) On November 2, 1992, Plaintiff filed a Motion for 
Continuance of the Trial. (R. 140-143.) 
On November 20, 1992, the trial court denied the Plaintiff's 
Motion for an Extension of Time to Designate an Expert Witness, 
and granted the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, thereby 
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dismissing the Plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. (R. 152-
154, 155-160.) 
B. Statement of Facts. 
1. On June 19, 19 89, L. Diane Turner (Plaintiff) underwent 
arthroscopic knee surgery performed by Dr. Craig McQueen. (R. 6, 
156.) After subsequent treatment by Dr. McQueen, Plaintiff 
sought treatment from Dr. Robert Home. 
2. On July 12, 19 89, Dr. Home saw Plaintiff and became 
her treating physician. (R. 8.) 
3. Plaintiff brought suit against Defendants and discovery 
commenced. (R. 2-11.) 
4. Plaintiff's Complaint alleged that Defendants owed her 
a duty to treat and care for her in a manner that was consistent 
with the standards of the medical community in which they 
practiced and that Defendants failed in that duty. (R. 4, 159.) 
5. As part of her prima facie case, Plaintiff was required 
to provide an expert witness who could testify regarding 
Defendants' alleged malpractice. 
6. A scheduling conference was held and it was agreed that 
Plaintiff's witnesses (expert and otherwise) were to be 
designated on July 31, 1992. (R. 34-35.) Trial was set for 
November 30, 1992. (R. 34.) On July 31, 1992, Plaintiff 
designated Dr. Robert Home as her sole expert witness. (R. 38, 
88, 157). 
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7. In late August 1992, Defendants made preparations to 
take the deposition of Dr. Home. On August 31, 1992, Defendants 
were told by Dr. Home that this was the first he had heard of 
being involved in a law suit, that he had never agreed to testify 
as an expert witness in this case, that he would not agree to do 
so now, and that the prior care given by Dr. McQueen was both 
necessary and appropriate. (R. 148-150, 157-159.) 
8. An affidavit was obtained from Dr. Home by Defendants 
and Dr. Home alerted Plaintiff's attorney of his opinion via fax 
on September 11, 1992. (R. 90-91, 148-150.) 
9. On September 11, 1992, Defendants moved for summary 
judgment on the grounds Plaintiff failed to produce competent 
expert testimony necessary to prevail on her medical malpractice 
claim. (R. 47-49.) Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was 
supported by Affidavits from both Dr. Home and Dr. Sherman 
Coleman. (R. 57-59, 60-62, 157.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I* Plaintiff is improperly attempting to appeal the trial 
court's adverse ruling on her Motions for an Extension of Time to 
Designate an Expert Witness and for Continuance of Trial. Denial 
of these motions is not a final judgment. 
II. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Plaintiff's Motions for an Extension of Time to Designate an 
Expert Witness and Continuance of Trial. Plaintiff had ample 
opportunity to find and prepare an expert witness for her case. 
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Plaintiff had nearly three years from the time she first gave 
notice to the Defendants of a law suit until the date set for 
Plaintiff to designate her expert witnesses. Plaintiff further 
knew that expert testimony was required to meet a prima facie 
element of her case and yet designated her only expert witness 
without asking him his opinion of Defendants' treatment or 
whether he would testify as her expert. When Plaintiff was 
notified that her expert was not willing to testify she still 
made no effort to find another until ten days later when she 
requested an extension. Finally, three weeks after she was 
notified that Dr. Home would not testify, Plaintiff moved for a 
continuance of the trial. 
Ill, Plaintiff failed to provide an expert witness to 
testify that an injury occurred as a result of a departure from 
the applicable standard of medical care. Expert testimony is 
necessary to establish a prima facie case. Because of this 
failure, Plaintiff has no testimony to contradict the testimony 
of Defendants' experts as to the care provided. There is no 
genuine issue of material fact and Defendants are entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT IS IMPROPERLY ATTEMPTING 
TO APPEAL A TRIAL COURT DECISION THAT IS NOT 
A FINAL JUDGMENT. 
Plaintiff has stated the following as her issue for review 
in this appeal: 
Whether or not the trial court judge abused her 
discretion in ruling that Dr. Robert Home, M.D. had 
never agreed to act as Plaintiff's expert, and since 
Dr. Home, M.D., for the first time on September 11, 
1992 indicated to Plaintiff that he would not act as 
such expert, the trial court abused her [sic] 
discretion in not granting Plaintiff's motion for a 
continuance of her trial, and an extension of time in 
which to designate a replacement expert. 
(Plaintiff's Brief, p. 1-2.) 
Plaintiff has not appealed from the trial court's entry of 
Summary Judgment--only from the denial of her Motion for an 
Extension of Time to Designate an Expert Witness and Motion for 
Continuance of Trial. Neither of these judgments ended the 
controversy between the parties nor finally disposed of the 
subject-matter of the litigation on the merits of the case. 
Denial of these motions is not a final judgment and the 
appeal should be dismissed. Cf. A.J. Mackay Co. v. Okland Const. 
Co., 817 P.2d 323, 325 (Utah 1991); Salt Lake City Corp. v. 
Layton. 600 P.2d 538, 539-60 (Utah 1979); Kennedy v. New Era 
Indus., Inc.. 600 P.2d 534, 535-37 (Utah 1979). 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS FOR AN 
EXTENSION OF TIME TO DESIGNATE AN EXPERT AND 
FOR A CONTINUANCE OF THE TRIAL. 
Plaintiff asks this court to find that the trial court 
abused its discretion in denying her motions to extend the time 
to designate an expert witness and continue the trial. In so 
doing, the Plaintiff argues that she was surprised by Dr. Robert 
Home's refusal to testify for her at trial and that as a result 
the trial court should have granted her a continuance of the 
trial scheduled for November 30, 1992 and extend the time during 
which the plaintiff could designate an expert to replace 
Dr. Home. 
Plaintiff spends some time listing facts which she presumes 
the trial court relied on in making its determination. However, 
the issue here is not what facts the trial court did or should 
have relied on, but whether its conclusion of denying the motion 
based on its findings was an abuse of discretion. In considering 
Plaintiff's motion, the trial court found: 
There is no evidence that the plaintiff or her attorney 
confirmed that Dr. Home would act as her expert wit-
ness, testifying that the standard of care was not met 
by the defendant Dr. McQueen. The evidence indicates 
that Dr. Home first learned that he had been appointed 
in this role when the defendants' attorneys called him 
to schedule his deposition. 
(R. 158). The trial court further found: 
The irrefuted evidence indicates Dr. Home objected to 
being designated as an expert witness and claimed he 
was not critical of the care rendered. Further, there 
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is no evidence before the Court that Dr. Home had 
changed his mind or his position with regard to this 
question; he had simply never been asked to be 
plaintiff's expert witness. 
(R. 158). 
The trial court found that the Plaintiff had ample 
opportunity to find and prepare an expert witness. (R. 159). 
Plaintiff had nearly three years from the time she first gave 
notice to the Defendants of a law suit until the date set for 
Plaintiff to designate her expert witnesses. (R. 156-57) . In 
January, 1992, plaintiff testified that Dr. Home had never voiced 
any criticism of the treatment she received by Dr. McQueen. (R. 
108-110) . When she designated Dr. Home as an expert, neither 
she, nor her attorney had contacted Dr. Home or asked him if he 
would act as her expert. 
Furthermore, Plaintiff took no immediate action when she was 
alerted, on September 11, 1992, that Dr. Home would not act as an 
expert witness in this case. Plaintiff did not file her motion 
for an extension until September 21, 1992, and did not ask for a 
continuance until November 2, 1992. (R. 92-102, 140-143). She 
had still not designated an expert as of November 20, 1992, when 
the various motions were argued. 
This was not a case of surprise. Ample time had been 
afforded since the commencement of the action in 1989 to utilize 
discovery procedures. See Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414, 416 (Utah 
1990) (holding that denial of a motion for a continuance is proper 
when the plaintiff was allowed ample time after the commencement 
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of a law suit to utilize discovery procedures). Plaintiff could 
have easily prevented the "surprise event" by simply asking Dr. 
Home if he would act as an expert before he was listed as her 
sole expert witness. The trial court was correct in denying the 
motion for a continuance. 
Plaintiff refers to a number of cases which she states are 
instructive to the issue at hand. The most instructive of these 
cases is Hill v. Dickerson. 839 P.2d 309 (Utah App. 1992). Hill 
involves a claim for dental malpractice arising in 1986, and filed 
in 1990. Despite court ordered deadlines, the plaintiff failed to 
timely produce competent medical expert testimony in favor of her 
negligence theories. The trial court denied the plaintiff's 
motion for a continuance and dismissed the complaint with 
prejudice. The Court of Appeals affirmed and held: 
The purpose of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is to 
effect total fairness for all parties in a suit. To 
allow one party to have continuance after continuance to 
the prejudice of the other party would be patently 
unfair. This is especially true when such continuances 
are being granted for the plaintiff, who triggers the 
time constraints of litigation by bringing the suit in 
the first place. It is equally unfair to allow a party 
to name new witnesses several days before trial. 
Allowing a party to do so at the last minute not only 
prejudices the other party by foreclosing adequate 
opportunity to depose said witnesses and find opposing 
witnesses to respond to the new testimony, but also 
encourages parties to do so as a trial strategy. 
Id. at 312. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals 
recognized that it was not error for a trial court to dismiss a 
plaintiff's case with prejudice due to their abuse of the 
opportunity to be heard through dilatory conduct. Id. 
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In the present case, Plaintiff had ample time in which to 
find an expert witness who would be willing to testify on behalf 
of the plaintiff. Plaintiff knew that the testimony of an expert 
witness was necessary to establish the prima facie elements of her 
malpractice suit and that this testimony was critical. 
The following finding of the Trial Court should be sustained: 
Plaintiff's Motion for an Extension of Time to Designate 
an Expert is untimely and is not well-taken in that the 
Motion was filed a full six weeks after the cut-off time 
for plaintiff's designation of experts. The Motion for 
an Extension is not supported by the facts or by case 
law. Plaintiff triggered the time constraints by filing 
her Notice to Commence a Medical Malpractice Claim 
against defendants. She had ample time and ample 
forewarning that she was required to produce expert 
testimony regarding the standard of care, a prima facie 
element of her case in chief. The Court finds and 
hereby holds that defendants should not be required to 
bear the burden of plaintiff's laxity, and finds no 
basis for a continuance. 
(R. 159.). 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHEN 
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROVIDE AN EXPERT WITNESS 
TO TESTIFY THAT AN INJURY OCCURRED AS A RESULT 
OF A DEPARTURE FROM THE APPLICABLE STANDARD OF 
MEDICAL CARE. 
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a 
motion for summary judgment should be granted only if the plead-
ings, depositions, admissions and affidavits show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Hunt v. Hurst, 785 
P.2d 414# 415 (Utah 1990). Consideration of a motion for summary 
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judgment requires this Court to examine the evidence in a light 
most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Id. 
In evaluating whether a genuine issue of material fact exists 
for purposes of summary judgment, the reviewing court must 
consider the standard of proof at trial on each element of the 
plaintiff's claim. Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 
740 P.2d 262, 264 (Utah App. 1987). A plaintiff who alleges a 
claim for medical malpractice does not establish a prima facie 
case until he or she can show, by competent evidence: (1) the 
standard of care required of the defendant as a practicing ortho-
pedic surgeon in the community; (2) the defendant's departure 
from the required standard of care; and (3) that such departure 
was the proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff. Nixdorf v. 
Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 351 (Utah 1980). 
The required showing must be made by competent expert 
testimony. Marsh v. Pemberton. 10 Utah 2d 40, 347 P.2d 1108 
(1959); Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 740 P.2d 262 
(Utah App. 1987). It is not sufficient to merely show that an 
adverse result occurred: an orthopedic surgeon, like any health 
care provider, is not an insurer or guarantor of results and no 
presumption of negligence may be inferred from the mere fact of an 
adverse outcome. 
The rationale for requiring expert testimony is clear. The 
issues presented by medical malpractice cases generally involve 
medical questions and medical judgments beyond the knowledge of 
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laymen. Kim v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1270# 1271 (Utah 1980). 
Without the assistance of expert medical testimony, the finder of 
fact is left to impermissibly base its verdict upon speculation 
and conjecture as to what standard of care was required of the 
defendant orthopedic surgeon and whether it was met, Anderson v. 
Nixon, 104 Utah 2d 262, 129 P.2d 220 (1943); Hoopiiaiana v. 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 740 P.2d 270 (Utah App. 1987). 
Plaintiff failed to provide the trial court with any expert 
testimony controverting that provided by the Defendants. Without 
such evidence, the court held: 
The defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
The Court finds there are no material issues of fact 
precluding Summary Judgment as a matter of law. The law 
requires plaintiff to establish a violation of the 
medical standard of care by expert testimony and the 
plaintiff's designated expert, Dr. Home, indicates he 
will not testify as to such a violation. Therefore, 
plaintiff cannot meet its burden of proof. 
(R. 153) . 
In this case, Summary Judgment is proper. The trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiff's motions for an 
extension of time and continuance of the trial. Plaintiff has not 
provided an expert witness required to meet her prima facie case. 
Defendants have provided affidavits from expert witnesses 
supporting their defense. As a result, no genuine issue of 
material fact exists and Defendants are entitled to judgement as a 
matter of law. 
Finally, Utah courts have consistently concluded that 
requests to continue summary judgment to allow further discovery 
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are properly denied. For example, in Jones v. Bountiful City 
Corp.. 834 P.2d 556 (Utah App. 1992), the Utah Appellate Court 
found that the trial court did not err in denying the motion for 
additional time for discovery after considering: (1) whether the 
reason articulated for additional discovery was adequate or was 
merely a "fishing expedition;" (2) whether the plaintiff had 
sufficient time to conduct discovery; and (3) whether the non-
moving party had been afforded an appropriate time to respond to 
the Motion for Summary Judgment. Here, Plaintiff seeks additional 
time simply to fish for an expert witness she has heretofore 
failed to do. As discussed earlier, Plaintiff has had ample time 
to conduct this discovery. Additionally, Plaintiff has been 
afforded the appropriate time to respond to the Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
Because the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are intended to 
"secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every 
action," the trial court's order granting Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment should be affirmed. Utah R. Civ. P. 1 (1993). 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff, in appealing from the trial court's denial of her 
Motion for Extension of Time to Designate Expert and Motion for 
Continuance of Trial, is apparently attempting to appeal from a 
trial court decision that is not a final judgment. As a result, 
this Court should dismiss Plaintiff's appeal. In the event this 
Court does not dismiss this appeal, it should affirm the trial 
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court's ruling. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying Plaintiff's motions when Plaintiff had ample time to 
designate an expert witness willing to testify as to a prima facie 
element of her case, and failed to do so. Defendants should not 
bear the burden of Plaintiff's laxity. 
DATED this y */L day of June, 1993. 
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Appellees 
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